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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Brian A. Albertson appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to 
seal his criminal case record.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In 2007, Albertson was charged by information with possession of 
marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of possession of 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 36-37.)  Pursuant to a plea bargain he pleaded 
guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine.  (R., p. 39.)  Albertson 
was granted a withheld judgment and placed on probation for three years.  (R., 
pp. 60-70.)  Following a successful probation, Albertson moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea and have his case dismissed.  (R., pp. 75-77.)  The state initially 
opposed the motion (R., p. 80), but then informed the court it had no objection to 
it  (R., pp. 82-83).  The court granted Albertson’s motion.  (R., pp. 83-85.) 
 In 2016, Albertson filed a “Motion In Support Of Request To Seal The 
Criminal Case Pursuant To Idaho Administrative Rule 32.”  (R., pp. 86-87.)  In it, 
Albertson sought to seal the record in his case, noting that since his plea had 
been withdrawn and case dismissed “I have attended college, graduating from 
Independence University with a Masters Degree in Public Health Care Policy,” 
and had accrued no other criminal convictions.  (R., p. 86.)  Albertson stated he 
was “seeking a job in my field and the information contained on the Idaho 
repository may inhibit my ability to find a job in my field.”  (R., p. 86.) 
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 Albertson reiterated these concerns when he spoke1 to the court at the 
hearing: 
As she’s mentioned, I have completed a master’s degree. I have 
three children. I’ve made it to every court hearing. I’ve completed 
my probation with no violations. I’m getting to the point where I’m 
applying for positions, and it gets to the point where I’m–“Have you 
been convicted of a felony?” If I put yes, even though you’re not 
automatically disqualified, it’s automatically disqualifying. If I put no 
and they pulled my records, it shows that I was convicted of a 
felony when the—the Court’s withheld judgment said that it would 
be dismissed after the completion of probation. That’s all. 
 
(Tr., p. 5, L. 15 – p. 6, L. 2.)  The state did not object to Albertson’s motion.2  (Tr., 
p. 6, Ls. 5-18.) 
 In ruling on Albertson’s motion, the district court found that Albertson 
“successfully completed his probation and, as a result, his plea of guilty was set 
aside, and his case was dismissed,” and that “[h]e no longer has a felony 
conviction as a matter of law.”  (Tr., p. 7, L. 24 – p. 8, L. 3.)  The court also noted 
that “I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson has 
been denied employment based upon the information in the repository. The 
motion speculates that that could happen. He does wish to enter into the 
healthcare field.”  (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-13.) 
                                            
1 Albertson was not sworn in and did not testify.  (See Tr.)  Similarly, his motion 
to seal was not supported by any affidavits or other exhibits.  (See R., pp. 86-87.) 
 
2 Albertson characterizes the state’s position as having no objection and 
“expressing that Mr. Albertson should get relief so long as it was in the court’s 
power to grant such relief.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1 (emphasis added).)  But this is 
incorrect; the prosecutor’s position was just that “the State would stand in no 
objection,” and it “would not object to anything that the Court finds within its 




 But the district court ultimately denied Albertson’s motion based on the 
following analysis: 
I guess this is my concern is I look at the privacy interests versus 
the public’s constitutional right to know and—you know, and I 
understand the concern regarding the felony conviction, but it could 
also very easily be a question: “Have you ever had a substance 
abuse problem?” And that’s a question that could be asked, and 
certainly I would suspect that in the healthcare field it may be 
asked. And this is my quandary: That Idaho has not exercised the 
true expungement record, and I would say that if there was anyone 
who ever appeared before me who deserved that, it would be you, 
but I don’t believe that the rule goes that far.  
 
And there was a similar circumstance in State vs. Allen, and, 
unfortunately, I cannot say that the privacy interest is outweighed 
by the public’s constitutional right to know, so I think at this point in 
time, I have to deny it without prejudice. I’m sorry, sir. 
 
(Tr., p. 8, L. 14 – p. 9, L. 8.) 
 The district court subsequently entered an order denying Albertson’s 





Albertson states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Albertson’s 
motion to seal his criminal case? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Albertson failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to seal 







Albertson Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Seal His Criminal Case 
 
A. Introduction 
 Albertson argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
Rule 32(i) motion to seal his criminal case record.  Specifically, he argues that 
“the district court appears to have reasoned, in part, that because Mr. Albertson 
failed to prove he was actually denied employment, he failed to make an 
adequate showing under Rule 32(i)(2)(C).”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Thus, 
Albertson claims, “[b]y holding Mr. Albertson to a standard of showing actual 
financial or economic harm, as opposed to the mere possibility of such harm,” 
the district court applied an incorrect standard and erred.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 10.) 
 This argument fails because the district court properly found that 
Albertson’s privacy interest did not outweigh the public’s constitutional right to 
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know about his conviction.3  Further, like the appellant who was denied relief in 
State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 325 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2014), Albertson has failed 
to show that it is the unsealed record, as opposed to the fact of the conviction, 
that could harm his economic interests.  Lastly, Albertson fails to show that the 
district court erred by holding him to a standard of showing actual harm.  For all 
these reasons the district court’s denial of Albertson’s motion was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
District court decisions to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 32 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Turpen, 
147 Idaho 869, 872, 216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009); Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 
325 P.3d at 677. 
 
 
                                            
3 The district court correctly explained the balancing test it would have to 
perform.  (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1-5.)  However, it seems the district court misstated its 
actual holding when it found that “unfortunately, I cannot say that the privacy 
interest is outweighed by the public’s constitutional right to know, so I think at this 
point in time, I have to deny it without prejudice.”  (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-8 (emphasis 
added).)  Plainly, the district court intended to say “the privacy interest 
outweighs” or “the public’s constitutional right to know is outweighed by,” 
otherwise, its denial of the motion makes no sense.  Albertson appears to agree 
with this reading of the holding, stating that the court “ultimately concluded that 
Mr. Albertson failed to meet his burden, under Rule 32(i)(3), to show that the 
harm to his economic or financial interests attendant to his case being available 
to the public, outweighed the public’s interest in knowing about his case.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.)  This brief will likewise proceed as if the district court 
held it could not find Alberton’s privacy interests outweighed the public disclosure 
interests, which its reasoning, conclusion, and order plainly show, but its 
apparently mistaken explanation of the holding does not. 
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C. The District Court Correctly Found That Albertson’s Privacy Interests Did 
Not Outweigh The Public Interest In Disclosure And Therefore Correctly 
Denied Albertson’s Motion To Seal His Criminal Case 
 
The public has a First Amendment right to know what goes on in criminal 
courts.  Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)).  The Supreme Court has held that 
the First Amendment does not just protect expressing ideas and disseminating 
information, but receiving information and ideas.  See Richmond Newspapers, 
448 U.S. at 576 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).  
Indeed, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.”  Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).  Criminal proceedings are therefore 
presumptively open, and “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, 
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.”  Richmond Newspapers, 
448 U.S. at 575-76, 581. 
Consistent with the public’s constitutional right to know what transpires in 
criminal proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court, “pursuant to [its] authority to 
control access to court records,” promulgated Idaho Court Administrative Rule 
32.  I.C.A.R. 32(a).  The Court expressly stated its purpose for doing so: 
The public has a right to access the judicial department’s 
declarations of law and public policy, and to access the records of 
all proceedings open to the public. This rule provides for access in 
a manner that: 
 
(1) Promotes accessibility to court records; 
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(2) Supports the role of the judiciary; 
 
(3) Promotes governmental accountability; 
 
(4) Contributes to public safety; 
 
(5) Minimizes the risk of injury to individuals; 
 
(6) Protects individual privacy rights and interests; 
 
(7) Protects proprietary business information; 
 
(8) Minimizes reluctance to use the court system; 
 
(9) Makes the most effective use of court and clerk of court staff; 
 
(10)  Provides excellent customer service; and 
 
(11)  Avoids unduly burdening the ongoing business of the judiciary. 
 
In the event of any conflict this rule shall prevail over any other rule 




Rule 32 strikes a balance “between the public’s constitutional right to 
access criminal records and the privacy rights of individuals,” exempting from 
disclosure “highly private information” such as PSI reports, jury questionnaires, 
and documents identifying grand jurors.  I.C.A.R. 32; Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 
325 P.3d at 677. 
In very narrow circumstances court records may be sealed or redacted 
“on a case-by-case basis” under Rule 32(i).  Districts courts do not have 
“unfettered discretion to seal case files” under this rule; “rather, a court is only 
allowed to seal portions of a case file after it finds that the petitioner’s privacy 
interests predominate over the public’s constitutional right to know.”  I.C.A.R. 
32(i); Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677.  Even then, “[i]f the court redacts 
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or seals records to protect predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the 
least restrictive exemption from disclosure consistent with privacy interests.”  
I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1).  Accordingly, before a district court may seal any portion of a 
case file, it must first determine in writing: 
(A) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate 
facts or statements, the publication of which would be highly 
objectionable to a reasonable person, or 
 
(B) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements 
that the court finds might be libelous, or 
 
(C) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, 
the dissemination or publication of which may compromise the 
financial security of, or could reasonably result in economic or 
financial loss or harm to, a person having an interest in the 
documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, 
records or public property of or used by the judicial department, or 
 
(D) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements 
that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or 
 
(E) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the 
documents or materials to preserve the right to a fair trial, or 
 
(F) That the documents contain personal data identifiers that 
should have been redacted pursuant to Rule 2.6 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, in which case the court shall order that the 
documents be redacted in a manner consistent with the provisions 




Rule 32(i) “requires that the district court ‘hold a hearing on the motion’ 
and ‘determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or 
public disclosure predominates.’”  State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504, 272 P.3d 
474, 476 (2012) (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1)). 
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 The district court here correctly concluded that the public interest in 
disclosure predominated over any privacy interest that Albertson had in sealing 
his records.  Specifically, the court found that employers, particularly health care 
employers, could justifiably want to know whether Albertson ever had a drug 
addiction problem—a question on which a methamphetamine possession 
conviction has self-evident bearing.  (See Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-22.)  The court 
reasoned that because Albertson would be seeking employment prospective 
employers could “very easily” inquire, “Have you ever had a substance abuse 
problem?”  (Tr., p. 8, Ls, 18-20.)  The district court further found that “certainly I 
would suspect in the healthcare field” that such a question “may be asked.”  (Tr., 
p. 8, Ls. 20-22.)  Albertson was convicted of felony drug possession and given 
the common-sense significance of this fact to employers—especially health care 
employers—the court concluded that “I have to deny [Albertson’s motion] without 
prejudice.”  (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 4-8.)  Considering the nature of Albertson’s crime it was 
entirely reasonable for the district court to find that the public’s right to know 
outweighed any claimed privacy interest. 
 Moreover, the district court correctly compared this case to State v. Allen.  
(See Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-8 (citing Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 325 P.3d 673).)  There, it was 
not the unsealed record of the conviction that harmed Allen’s interests, but the 
fact of the conviction itself.  This was first pointed out by the lower court: 
Mr. Allen has not presented the Court with any “exceptional 
circumstances” that would warrant the sealing of his criminal 
records. While he believes that his disclosure to prospective 
employers that he is a convicted felon hurts his chances for 
employment, whether or not the court record is sealed has not 
been shown to adversely affect his employment capabilities. Thus it 
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appears that the major impediment to employment is the conviction 
itself. This Court, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs Mr. Allen’s interest in 
privacy. Accordingly, his motion to seal his criminal records is 
denied. 
 
156 Idaho at 337, 325 P.3d at 678.  The Allen Court affirmed the district court’s 
ruling and its logic: 
At the hearing on Allen’s motion, he testified that his economic 
interests were harmed by having a felony conviction, asserting that 
he could not obtain employment with government contractors due 
to the existence of the felony conviction. He did not, however, 
explain how the sealing of his record would make any difference. 
Clearly, absent a dismissal or reduction of the felony conviction, 
Allen would still be required to disclose to prospective employers 
that he was a convicted felon, regardless of whether his file was 
sealed. Even if Allen’s economic interests were affected by his 
felony conviction, those interests were not affected due to any 
legitimate privacy concerns. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 That holding squarely applies in this case.  Albertson told the district court 
that: 
I’m getting to the point where I’m applying for positions, and it gets 
to the point where I’m—“Have you been convicted of a felony?” If I 
put yes, even though you’re not automatically disqualified, it’s 
automatically disqualifying. If I put no and they pulled my records, it 
shows that I was convicted of a felony when the—the Court’s 
withheld judgment said that it would be dismissed after the 
completion of probation. That’s all. 
 
(Tr., p. 5, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 2.) 
Note that the question at issue is “Have you been convicted of a felony.”  
(Tr., p. 5, Ls. 18-21.)  Because Albertson once pleaded guilty to a felony, 
regardless of whether his record is sealed now, the truthful answer to that 
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question will always be “yes.”4  (See United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 404-
07, 179 P.3d 1059, 1060-63 (2008)). And it is clear from Albertson’s statement to 
the district court that the fact of the prior conviction is what jeopardizes his 
response to potential employers:  Albertson must either answer “yes” and 
disclose this “automatically disqualifying” fact, or alternatively, answer “no” and 
risk an employer checking the repository and quickly discovering not only the fact 
of the conviction, but that the application misstated it.  Given these 
circumstances, a sealed record would only work to prevent employers from 
verifying whether, if Albertson answers “no,” the answer is correct.  This is not a 
“legitimate privacy concern,” let alone a privacy concern that would outweigh the 
public’s constitutional right to know about the conviction.  Much like the appellant 
in Allen, Albertson would still be required to disclose his conviction to employers, 
regardless of the seal, and as such this dilemma is not a legitimate privacy 
concern affecting his economic interests.  See 156 Idaho at 337, 325 P.3d at 
                                            
4 Albertson claims to the contrary that “if a job application asked, ‘Have you 
previously been convicted of a felony,’ the truthful response would probably be 
‘yes’.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 3, n. 2.)  But given the legal standards it is unclear 
why he contends this would only be “probably” so.  Because Albertson previously 
pleaded guilty to a felony, and because Idaho law treats a guilty plea as a 
conviction even if later withdrawn pursuant to a withheld judgment, the truthful 
answer to that question, or the similar question “have you been convicted of a 
felony,” will invariably be “yes.”  See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404-07, 179 P.3d at 
1060-63 (2008).  (“Thus, a conviction occurs ‘by the verdict of a jury … or upon a 
plea of guilty’ and it must precede punishment.”); State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 
273, 278, 581 P.2d 319, 324 (1978) (“We conclude that for purposes of I.C. 
§ 19-101 conviction occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the 
court.”); see also State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 26, 319 P.3d 1191, 1195 (2014) 
(“Instead, withdrawing a guilty plea and dismissing the case does not change the 
fact that the defendant pled guilty or was found guilty.”). 
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678.  Based on the holding of Allen the district court thus correctly denied 
Albertson’s motion. 
 On appeal, Albertson does not challenge the district court’s finding that 
employers, and particularly health care employers, could justifiably want to know 
whether he had a substance addiction problem.  (See generally, Appellant’s 
brief.)  Albertson focuses instead on the district court’s statements regarding his 
claimed privacy interest.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)  He argues the court 
abused its discretion “[b]y holding Mr. Albertson to a standard of showing actual 
financial or economic harm, as opposed to the mere possibility of such harm,” 
and in doing so “applied a more stringent standard than that called for under 
Rule 32(i)(2)(C).”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  Albertson claims the district court’s 
remarks that “I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson 
had been denied employment,” and that Albertson “speculates” such a denial 
could happen, show the district court erroneously holding him to a standard of 
showing actual harm.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10 (quoting Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-12).) 
This argument fails because at no point did the district court adopt a legal 
standard that Albertson had to show actual harm.  (See generally Tr.)  Indeed, it 
appears the court was simply reciting factual findings, and not creating a new 
legal standard, when it observed the following: 
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I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson 
has been denied employment based upon the information in the 
repository.[5] The motion speculates that that could happen. He 
does wish to enter into the healthcare field. 
 
(Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-13.)  However, the district court never suggested that the actuality 
of the harm had any effect on its analysis, let alone did it adopt a legal standard 
that Rule 32(i) required Albertson to show actual harm.  Instead, the court gave 
every indication that it took Albertson’s claimed concerns at face value, but 
simply concluded that the public interest outweighed them: 
I guess this is my concern is I look at the privacy interests versus 
the public’s constitutional right to know and -- you know, and I 
understand the concern regarding the felony conviction, but it could 
also very easily be a question: “Have you ever had a substance 
abuse problem?”. . . . 
 
(Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-20 (emphasis added).)  Albertson’s claim of error therefore fails 
because he fails to show the district court placed any analytical significance on 
the actuality of the harm.  And Albertson falls far short of showing that the district 
court abused its discretion by holding him, even implicitly, “to a standard of 
showing actual financial or economic harm.”  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  The 
district court here properly conducted a Rule 32(i) analysis when it balanced 
Albertson’s privacy rights with the rights of the public to know about his crime, 
and correctly denied his motion. 
                                            
5 The court could have meant there was “no evidence” of job loss in two senses: 
Albertson did not aver that he actually lost any job opportunities because of his 
criminal record (R., pp. 86-87; Tr,. p. 3, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 2), and Albertson 
arguably did not support his motion with any evidence in the form of affidavits, 
sworn testimony, exhibits, or the like (R., pp. 86-87).  Cf. State v. Cunningham, 
161 Idaho 698, ___, 390 P.3d 424, 428 (2017) (holding that “unsworn 
representations, even by an officer of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial 





 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order 
denying Albertson’s motion to seal. 
 DATED this 29th day of June, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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